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Over the past two decades, governments have increasingly contracted private military and security companies (PMSCs) for support of military operations in conflicts. However, many observers have argued that such companies are “greedy market actors” or “reckless mercenaries” and their level of performance very poor. A minority has defended them as security professionals. If market competition is present, the level of performance is high and positive contributions to the clients military operation can be expected. However, neither PMSC opponents nor proponents can account for the variance in level of performance in three crucial cases, Sierra Leone, Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that different market structures are able to explain this variance. At least three ideal configurations exist: a collaborative, a competitive and a rival structure. These structures influence the level of performance. PMSC-performance levels are expected to decreases from the first configuration, being positive, to the last, being negative. 
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Private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become a common sight in current military operations. Governmental agencies, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and even the military itself have all relied increasingly on PMSCs, i.e., armed commercial actors to provide security and combat services in conflict zones (Avant, 2005).  However, this practice has been met with widespread criticism for a variety of reasons. Normatively, there is some concern with the state’s monopoly of force and the market competencies regarding the use of force being undermined. Many proponents of the PMSC trend bypass this normative debate and underscore the gains in effectiveness when market actors are hired (Carafano, 2008). According to this perspective, PMSCs are able to increase the effectiveness of the armed forces by providing missing capabilities, while delivering a wide range of support services necessary to military operations (Donald, 2006, 33). However, some skeptics are not convinced of the blessings of market actors. Instead of delivering a high quality service, they are rather expected to reduce their effort to increase profit. The result is poor performance and a decrease in effectiveness. Some even go as far to claim that “[c]apitalism simply does not mesh with the way the Army operates” (Rasor and Bauman, 2007, 234). Although proponents do not subscribe to this point of view, they acknowledge that an unchecked market has detrimental effects. However, two market mechanisms are discussed in the literature that are able to prevent shirking behavior by PMSCs: oversight and competition. Oversight by the client is considered to prevent corporate actors from reducing their efforts and guarantees a high level of performance (Stöber, 2007, 133). Competition assures that the client is able to replace a poor-performing agent (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2012). 
 However, neither oversight nor competition accounts for the complexity of the empirical picture of PMSC performance. In the case of Sierra Leone, competition and oversight was absent and yet the level of performance was high. Oversight was present and competition tight in Afghanistan and Iraq, yet the level of performance was mixed in Iraq and very poor in Afghanistan. Despite the lacking explanatory power of the competition and oversight argument the claim here is not that these arguments are wrong.  However, they require a particular type of market in which to effectively operate, i.e., the neoclassical market. As the conditions of this market type are not always present, this again limits explanatory power. In other words, what has been neglected in the current literature are different market structures. Although some authors have alluded to different market arrangements and their problems, the market structure is not included in their analysis, and the neoclassical model of markets is implicitly assumed (Avant, 2005, 22-26, Leander, 2006, 58). Accordingly, markets are simply arenas where anonymous self-interested actors exchange goods and services (Jackson, 2007, 237). In its most pure version, institutional or structural features are not taken into account, and the outcome is seen as being exclusively determined by the actions of the individuals (Rosenbaum, 2000, 459). However, this market model is criticized in the economic literature for its unrealistic assumptions of complete information, the assumption of anonymity among market participants, and for treating the market as a black box without paying attention to its social structure (Beckert, 2009, 249, Fligstein and Dauter, 2007, 113). This article moves away from standard neoclassical economics and suggests a sociological perspective emphasizing the social structure of markets. PMSC behavior is therefore strongly shaped by the market structure itself. The argument is that the PMSC’s level of performance varies according to the social structure of the market for force. There are three ideal market types: the coalition market, the neoclassical market, and the racketeer market. Each implies a different relationship between the actors, with different effects on the level of PMSC performance.
The article proceeds by providing a brief introduction to the idea of social structures of the market. Subsequently, the three market structures are introduced in more detail and their respective impact on PMSCs performance is traced in thee key cases: Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. 





Social Structure of the Market for Force
At its core, any market is set up to solve a coordination problem between the diverging interests of the participating actors. While actors have a shared interest in exchange, they have conflicting interests about the price, conditions, and specifications (Beckert, 2009, 248). Currently, the analysis of market relations is dominated by the neoclassical market approach. It follows methodological individualism and hence offers a structure-free account of markets. The outcome is solely the result of a price-oriented interaction of the anonymous actors (Jackson, 2007, 235). However, from a sociological point of view, even this minimalist approach contains already much of a social structure (Fligstein, 2001, 28). Accordingly, the neoclassical markets require a great deal of shared knowledge, regarding aspects such as the functions of money. Moreover it is governed by shared rules of competition between market actors who trade, based on prices. Though the neoclassical approach is widely accepted, this market structure is not necessarily inevitable. Indeed, any service market structure displays similarities, as it is built around the same necessary components: the principal, who is the hiring party, and the agent, who is hired to act on behalf of the principal. However, markets are not uniform phenomena, the rules and business practices that govern the relationship between the market participants varies (Fligstein and Dauter, 2007, 112). For instance, price might not be the main criteria upon which trading partners are selected. The argument is that different market structures have different effects on the level of performance of the agent. There are three basic structures: a market may display a “collaborative”, “competitive”, or “rival” structure.​[1]​ A collaborative structure is characterized by voluntary exchange, and the actors are interested in achieving the best result for both sides. In a competitive structure, the actors voluntarily exchange goods and services, yet they seek to maximize their own respective interest instead of seeking the result that is best for both. Finally, in a rival structure, actors take even extreme measures to realize their self-interest, i.e., to coerce the other party into a relationship. Furthermore, they seek not only to maximize their profit, but also to thwart the goals of the other. 
In the subsequent section, the different market structures are introduced in more detail, and the impact of the respective structures on PMSCs performance will be traced in three key cases: Sierra Leone, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The cases were selected as they are so far those with the most extensive PMSC-support provided in non-permissive environments. Furthermore, these cases provide fertile ground to probe the market structure approach. The idea of different market structures would be undermined if the variance in PMSC performance could be explained by the mechanisms of the neoclassical market. In this regard, the three cases are the “most likely cases” to probe the explanatory power of the competition and oversight argument. As will be outlined below, there was little to no competition, and no oversight in the Sierra Leone case and plenty of competing firms and tight oversight in Afghanistan and Iraq, which suggests a poor performance in the former and a high performance in the latter cases.

Sierra Leone: A coalition market
For the last two decades, Sierra Leone has been the unfortunate exemplar of a failed state, plagued by civil war, mass atrocities, and coups d’état. Since the early 1990s, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel group waged war against various Sierra Leone governments over control of territory and access to the diamond mines (Reno, 1997, 501-502). 
Type of market: The market for force in Sierra Leone displays all the characteristics of a coalition market. Historically, such markets existed around the 11th century. Merchants in the Mediterranean region maintained trade relationships with geographically remote partners, despite the fact that they could have easily disappeared with the capital or cheated in the conduct of business (Greif, 1989, 858). What kept the market together was the idea of coalition between market actors. Despite some divergence of interests, principals and agents shared a strong sense of solidarity among each other. A coalition was therefore necessarily a non-anonymous organizational framework through which trade was established and conducted (Ibid, 868). Such a close relationship between principal and agent can also be found on the Sierra Leone market. Executive Outcomes (EO), a now defunct South African firm, was the agent contracted by the Sierra Leone government. EO employees did not consider themselves as a mere service provider, but they considered themselves as “Africans ready to help other Africans” (Rubin, 1997, 48 & 53). The close relationship is also indicated by the firm setting up its headquarters in facilities which were controlled by the Sierra Leone Army, preparing military and intelligence briefings for the president and its employees wearing Sierra Leonean uniforms (Rubin, 1997). 
Furthermore, at the core, the business relationships on coalition markets is collaborative. Indeed actors on the market want to make a profit, yet not at the expense of the other party. Any transaction had to benefit both parties (Greif, 1989, 868). This applies to the relationship between EO and the Sierra Leone government. The firm indeed was in business for the profit, but charged prices which were reasonable when measured against the client’s budget. The government paid US$35 million for a two-year-operation. The bill represents only one-third of the total war costs and was significantly cheaper than a comparable UN operation (Shearer, 1998, 51). Moreover, although the government of Sierra Leone defaulted on its payments, EO only threatened to leave, but did not actually do so until January 1997, when it was required to depart after the Abidjan peace accord. Reportedly, EO offered the Sierra Leone government a deferral of payments until it could afford to settle its bills (Howe, 1998, 314).  
Finally, the Sierra Leone market displayed the typical sanction mechanism of a coalition market. Historically, honesty was of the utmost importance to all actors on coalition markets. A cheating actor had therefore not only to face sanctions by the cheated, but was also excluded from further trade by all members of the coalition (Greif, 1989, 868-868). Reputation was the indicator for differentiating honest from dishonest agents. Past conduct allowed an agent to build such a reputation and endowed him with a credible claim that he would not breach the contract (Ibid, 859). This practice can be observed on the Sierra Leone market as well. For instance, in the case of divergent behavior, the cheating actor is excluded from further trade by all members of the coalition. This happened in the case of Gurkha Security Guard (GSG), which was hired to train the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) in January 1995 and pulled out only four months later in the midst of fighting the RUF. The common perception was that the firm had left the client in a vulnerable position, which disqualified it as a reliable partner (Singer, 2003, 26). This seriously impaired its future business opportunities. For instance, EO declined to later form a strategic alliance with GSG. GSG had “damaged its reputation beyond repair” and was “little more than a letterhead” by the end of the 1990s (Vines, 2002, 136).

Level of performance: The goal of the Sierra Leone government was to gain back control of the country, to defeat the rebels and to eventually hold elections (Shearer, 1998, 50-51, Rubin, 1997, 48). EO was hired to support these goals by providing training and military support to the Sierra Leone Army in defeating the RUF (Barlow, 2007, 388). The structure of coalition markets suggests a thorough implementation of the contract, as the agent does not want to make a profit at the expense of the client. The Sierra Leone example displays such an outcome. With regards to military support, after two months in the country, EO had secured the capital Freetown, retaken the diamond and rutile mines, and destroyed the strongholds of the RUF (Shearer, 1999, 50-51). In February-March 1996, the firm had pushed back the rebels and stabilized the situation enough to hold a presidential election. Ian Douglas, a retired Canadian general and UN negotiator in Sierra Leone, has acknowledged the important role of EO and claimed that the firm had brought stability (quoted in: (Howe, 1998, 315). 
However, the threshold for good performance on a coalition market is higher. Coalition markets are also characterized by the agent going beyond the written letters of the contract if necessary. The principal can rely on the agent to perform the necessary tasks on his behalf to protect his interest, which may include tasks beyond just the exchange of goods and payment (Greif, 1989, 865). Such behavior can be observed on the Sierra Leone market. EO was not contracted to protect the local population, but to repel the rebels. The firm could have applied a combat strategy that had exposed EO personnel to as little risk as possible. Nevertheless, EO chose a more risky strategy in the attempted to minimize civilian casualties. For instance, the helicopter pilots could have attacked targets from a higher altitude in order to minimize the risk of ground fire. Such a strategy would have most certainly succeeded in repelling the poorly trained RUF rebels. However, the company’s pilots flew only a few hundred feet above the ground to be able to identify rebels properly (Hooper, 1997, 46-47). Apparently they even complained about their problems of differentiating between rebels and civilians (Rubin, 1997). Still, some incidents of violent transgressions or indiscriminate fire by EO personnel were reported (Vines, 2000, 175). Another example of EO going beyond the written contract is its help for the local population. The firm could have avoided draining its resources by not taking on additional tasks. However, in some cases EO employees took over policing responsibility by rescuing civilian hostages from the RUF, working with local villagers, addressing crime and responding to threats to the population (Rubin, 1997, 50 & 52). EO also worked closely with aid agencies, assisted in re-settlement programs for displaced persons and provided security, logistics and intelligence to humanitarian organizations (Ashworth, 1996, Smith, 1997), as well as limited medical and water supplies to the civilian population (Howe, 1998, Barlow, 2007). 
Indeed, the restricted use of force and avoiding civilian casualties was part of EO’s strategy to build good relations with the local population in order to gain intelligence on the RUF rebels. However, at the same time it was part of “winning hearts and minds” campaign (Howe, 1998, 316). According to the former Rhodesian counterinsurgency doctrine, according to which EO personnel were trained, a government can only decide the outcome of a struggle in an insurgency by winning the support of the people. Providing protection to civilians in Sierra Leone was crucial in gaining the support of the majority of the population (Cilliers, 1985, 135 & 202). In summary, the company’s military operations not only drove the rebels back and saved the government from destruction, but also brought stability to the country and thereby furthered the client’s interest.
EO’s record on the build-up and training of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) is more mixed. Many PMSCs in Sierra Leone were engaged in training the SLA. However, success was limited, as the SLA was less a force than a patronage system, poorly led and incapable of fighting (Douglas, 1999, 178). Under EO’s tutelage, the quality of performance improved substantially. The firm set up basic training courses for the SLA recruits and additional classes on intelligence gathering, command and control, fire support, logistics and communications (Douglas, 1999, 181-182). A month after the firm’s arrival, the SLA, led by EO personnel, drove back the RUF from the capital (Avant, 2009, 110). EO then decided to train additionally a local militia outside the state structure, the Kamajors. The Kamajors were a hunting tribe and promised to be a more capable force in fighting the RUF than the SLA. Over the course of the war, the militia grew into more than a 10,000 member strong force. Although this force helped to turn around the war by manning combat units and providing intelligence (Pech, 1999, 94, Howe, 1998, 316), it created an additional competing power center aside from the government (Gberie, 2005, 134). 

Competition and Oversight: Due to the weakness of the state and its armed forces in particular, several foreign firms were contracted to provide security-related services as early as the mid-1990s (O'Brian, 2000). Against this backdrop, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski argue that the Sierra Leone market was competitive as there were numerous firms operating in the country, such as Ibis Air, Teleservice, Lifeguard, EO, Gurkha Security Guard (GSG), Sandline, DSL (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2012, 23). However, these firms did not compete but were rather subsidiaries of each other, and some even formed business alliances with each other (Musah, 2000, 105). For instance, Lifeguard, Teleservice and Ibis Air were all subsidiaries of EO (Douglas, 1999, 187).  GSG and DSL had no ties to EO, yet did not compete in the military segment of the market. Both firms provided security services rather than fully fledged military operations (Vines, 2000, 184-186). In fact only two firms, EO and Sandline, were able to provided direct support for military operations (Musah and Fayemi, 2000, 87-89). However, both firms had close ties, drawing on the same personnel pool and cooperating on contracts (Pech, 1999, 92). Finally, there was no anonymous competition for contracts between firms, but rather just on personal contacts. Sandline’s contract with Papua New Guinea, for instance, was reportedly brokered by the chairman of DSL, who recommended the services of the firm (Vines, 2002, 134-135). In the case of EO and Sierra Leone, it seems that executives of Branch Energy, a mining company, introduced the firm to then-president Valentine Strasser (Avant, 2005, 86). 
In summary, EO’s good performance cannot be explained by the mechanisms of the neoclassical market. As shown, there was no competition preventing potential poor performance by EO. However, the structure of the coalition market accounts for EO’s high-level performance. The firm was not only motivated by profits, but as well, driven by a commitment to help other Africans. EO worked to further the client’s goals. 

Neoclassical market: Iraq
There was no private security market in Iraq prior to the US-led invasion in March 2003. A few weeks after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, PMSCs arrived to provide their services in the reconstruction of the country. 

Type of market: In contrast to Sierra Leone, Iraq was not a coalition market, but a neoclassical market. The market is build around the idea of anonymous and profit driven actors based engaging in voluntary exchange. The first indication of Iraq being a neoclassical market is therefore the absence of an intimate principal-agent relationship between principal and agent. Market exchange in Iraq took place between anonymous actors. The anonymity of the market is underscored by its size. According to the Department of Defense (DoD), about 60 firms operated in the country, while the Private Security Company Association of Iraq put the number at approximately 181, and The New York Times calculated that about 310 companies from all over the world did such security related business in Iraq  ADDIN EN.CITE (Government Accountability Office, 2005, Glanz, 29. October 2008, Isenberg, 2009). Similarly, the total number of armed security personnel varies, but in any case, it ranged in the thousands. From 2003 to 2007, the number of armed contractors ballooned from 10,000 to approximately 30,000 or 40,000 (Traynor, 10 December 2003, Witte, 8. September 2005, Miller, 2007). As far as the customer base was concerned, it was not only the weak host state that hired PMSCs. Multiple actors hired security companies, e.g., governmental, non-governmental organizations, private actors, and international organizations. The U.S. military was the largest contracting party in Iraq, and its contracting practices exemplify the anonymity of contracting in the neoclassical market. Contracting for the military was done by numerous command agencies on a bidding basis outside Iraq, while the recipients of the services were in the theater of operations (Cotton et al., 2010). In consequence, the actual recipient, the U.S. military field commanders, had limited awareness of contractor support, what the PMSCs were supposed to do, or how to deal with them (General Accounting Office, 2003, 31). 
The second indication of Iraq being a neoclassical market is the competitive relationship between the principal and the agent. Actors on a neoclassical market are guided by “their objective functions (utility, profit)” and gaining individual profit, even at the expense of the other party. They are not following the idea of mutual benefit (Ben-Porath, 1980, 4). In particular in the beginning, Iraq was a bonanza for security firms. Neither government nor non-government clients had extensive experience in contracting with security firms (Stoddard et al., 2008, 13). This provided fertile ground for PMSCs to take advantage of the situation to increase profits. In some cases the client was desperate to find a security contractor and was ready to pay almost any amount (Donald, 2006, 15). Overcharging was therefore a common practice in the early Iraqi market. In the case of the U.S. government agencies, for instance, the Special Investigator for Iraqi Reconstruction warned constantly of overbilling in the millions of U.S. dollars (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010). Another way for the agent to increase profit was to cut costs. A common practice in this regard was to hire less-qualified personnel. A highly qualified Western operator with many years of experience in a combat zone is quite expensive for a company, while less qualified third-country nationals for the same job are much cheaper (Engbrecht, 2011, 205-06). The low level of qualification of course affected the service quality delivered to the customer in a negative way. 

Level of performance: In Iraq, the U.S. was engaged in a counterinsurgency operation in Iraq and nation building effort. This meant that reconstruction measures such as the rebuilding of the infrastructure, establishing and training of the Iraqi security forces, and the restoring of political institutions had to be implemented, while fighting an insurgency at the same time. As this effort required a massive infrastructure, the insurgence did not lack for potential targets, e.g., supply convoys, reconstruction personnel, and civilian and military compounds. PMSCs were contracted to provide security services, and to carry out training programs for the Iraqi forces. However, on a neoclassical market actors are guided by opportunistic self-seeking behavior, competing with each other for the greatest benefit. Neither is concerned about the benefit for the other party. While the principal wants to extract as much benefit as possible from the agent and pay the lowest price in order to increase his utility, the agent in turn hopes to get away with as little effort as possible in order to increase his profit. The agent can therefore not be expected to provide any effort beyond the contracted task, and even those tasks cannot always be expected to be performed optimally. The default behavior, instead, is little effort and poor performance and overcharging in order to extract more profit (Child et al., 2005, 23).​[2]​ Indeed, in Iraq, the competitive structure did not yield defecting behavior in the sense of the agent receiving the money and then not delivering any service. In fact, there are no reports of armed security contractors abandoning their clients in Iraq. However, the firms in the Iraqi market kept closely to the letter of the contract and even sought to interpret it narrowly. According to Anna Leander, this caused continuous haggling over the exact nature of obligations (Leander, 2006, 78-79). This was in contrast to the practices in the coalition market where EO went beyond the letter of the contract to further the client’s goals. A representative of one of the major U.S. firms in the industry explained that when the U.S. Army moved to counterinsurgency, the government did not go back to review all these contracts to make sure that those services were adjusted to the new mission goal.​[3]​ As a consequence, many PMSCs were fulfilling their contractual obligations to the letter, yet without taking the broader aims of the client into consideration. Often the firms employed aggressive force and suppressive fire to maximize protection for the operators. The security firm “Custer Battles”, for instance, had been hired to provide convoy security in Iraq. Indeed, the firm did supply security guards, but they were underqualified and underequipped (Fainaru, 2008, 53-61). Custer Battles guards were told by their team leader to shoot preemptively at civilians to keep everyone back from the motorcade. This included shooting at any car that came near the convoy, even with families inside (Rasor and Bauman, 2007, 121-122, 127). Due to its conduct, the firm became debarred from further contracts with the U.S. government in 2006 (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010, 134). However, the practices displayed by Custer Battles were widespread among PMSCs firms in Iraq. Ann Exline Starr, for instance, a former CPA advisor, described the behavior of her personal security detail as very aggressive (Fainaru, 20 Sept. 2007). In general, observers considered PMSC behaving aggressively almost on a routine basis (Jabbar and Faraj, 2007). Such conduct had serious repercussions on the overall mission goals of the client as indiscriminate use of force often harmed civilian bystanders (Schumacher, 2006, 253). According to Brig. Gen. Horst’s account, between May and July 2005, at least a dozen shootings of civilians by contractors had left six Iraqi civilians killed and three wounded (Human Rights First, 2008, 8). Although the firms did what they were contracted to do, the way they were performing the task did not further the broader goals of the client.  U.S. Army Colonel Peter Mansoor, an expert on COIN, explains the consequences for the overall mission: “[I]f they push traffic off the roads or if they shoot up a car that looks suspicious, whatever it may be, they may be operating within their contract – to the detriment of the mission, which is to bring the people over to your side” (Hodge, 2007). Shawn Engbrecht, a former Ranger and security contractor in Iraq, gave a similar account. He drew a direct connection between the brutal behavior of PMSCs killing Iraqi civilians and the fast growth of the insurgency (Engbrecht, 2011, 29).

The competitive relation had also effects on the buildup of the Iraqi armed forces. PMSCs have been engaged in training the Iraqi army and police forces. In 2003, the U.S. security firm Vinnell won the contract to train the first Iraqi army battalions with the option to extend the contract. However, Vinnell reportedly deployed unqualified personnel and maintained an unsuitable curriculum for the training (Avant, 2005, 124-125). Some observers considered Vinnell’s approach as not serious and perfunctory (Calbreath, 2004). In any case, when the first battalions were deployed, they were not combat ready and many of the soldiers deserted (Cha, 2003). According to Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton, the bungled training resulted in an entire year without progress (Calbreath, 2004). As a consequence, Vinnell’s contract was not extended and the U.S. Army took over the training. Another example is the U.S. firm DynCorp, which was contracted to provide field training to the Iraqi police (Isenberg, 2010). However, according to the Iraq Study Group, the readiness and competence of the police were substantially worse than that of the army. The police had neither the training nor the equipment to fight organized crime, insurgents, and militias (Baker and Hamilton, 2006, 13). Furthermore, DynCorp apparently was not able to account for U.S.$ 36.4 Mio. of weapons and equipment. Moreover, the firm had charged the U.S. government for the construction of a camp which was never used (Witte and Merle, 2007).

Competition and oversight: On the neoclassical market competition and oversight are considered to have a disciplining effect on the agent. If the competition is high, the client is able to swap to another provider at any time. The shadow of possible future deals has a motivating effect on even self-interested agents to provide high quality services (Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski, 2012, 9-10). However, the presupposition is that the client has to actually detect the agent’s poor performance, which is difficult due to the information asymmetry. In contrast to the principal, the agent is involved in the day to day business and has therefore a better picture of his own performance, yet will not convey any such information that might be disadvantageous to his interests (Stöber, 2007, 123). To avoid being misled, the principal requires his own oversight structure that enables him to monitor the actions of the agent and to check for his compliance (Singer, 2003, 153-54). The performance pattern of agents in Iraq underscores this assumption. Most of the poor performance occurred in the first half of the Iraq mission, when no oversight structure was in place to control the agent (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2005). After the Nisour Square incident in 2007, when 17 Iraqi civilians were killed by members of a U.S.-contracted PMSC, things started to change. The U.S. government standardize the rules for the use of force and to institutionalize oversight (Department of Defense and Department of State, 5. December 2007). The Multinational Force Iraq established a central oversight body, the Armed Contractor Oversight Division  (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2008). Although the system had many shortfalls, for instance, all contractors not under a U.S. contract were not covered, empirical data nevertheless suggests with this oversight measure in place, the performance of these private market actors increased greatly (Petersohn, 2011). In a 2008 survey by the RAND Corporation, U.S. armed forces personnel were asked whether PMSCs had displayed aggressive behavior. 82% of respondents said they had ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ witnessed unnecessarily threatening actions, while 15% responded that they had ‘sometimes’ and only 3% claimed had ‘often’ witnessed it (Cotton et al., 2010, 29). In essence, PMSCs displayed poor performance in the beginning and spread insecurity by using force indiscriminately. After an oversight structure had been established, the situation improved. Unfortunately, in the training area, oversight did not improve. As the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction concluded in a 2010 report, one of the main causes for the lack of performance was a history of weak oversight (Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010, 5).  
In summary, the results support the prediction on the neoclassical markets. The agents acted opportunistic, seeking to increase profit by overcharging and providing poor quality services. Moreover, the firms did not take into consideration the interest of the client and hence, in some cases, their actions even undermined the overall military goals of their client. Only if the client implemented an oversight system did their performance improve. 


Racketeer Market: Afghanistan
Prior to the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, there was no market for force existent in Afghanistan. Private security contractors came on the heels of the Western forces and their nation-building efforts. 

Type of market: The market in Afghanistan is a racketeer market. This is not contradicted by the presence of legal corporations. The reported size of the Afghan market varies between 39 to 52 licensed firms and between 19,000 to 30,000 employees, it is a large market in any case (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, Sherman and DiDomenico, 2009, 4). In contrast to the Iraqi market, where almost all major firms were foreign, 44 per cent of the firms in the Afghan market are local. The Afghan market also differs from Iraq in that personnel are mainly Afghans: Only up to 8,000 PMSC operators are foreigners (Schmeidel, 2008, 16-17).  However, a prime indicator for a racketeer market is that not only companies and entrepreneurs are present, but also militias, strongmen or warlords (Keen, 1998, 11). On the Afghan market, the number of armed security providers operating without a license is estimated at around 5,000 militias nationwide with upwards of 120,000 armed individuals (Sherman and DiDomenico, 2009, 14). Both market segments overlap significantly. Out of this pool, between 1,000 and 1,500 militias have been employed, trained, and armed by the International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF) in order to provide security reconstruction efforts and convoy protection. Even some transnational PMSCs have hired local militias to increase personnel and to fulfill their contractual obligations (Sherman and DiDomenico, 2009, 4, 6-7). The amalgamation of the two sides of the market is further underscored by their use of a similar recruitment pool. Since it is difficult for registered PMSCs to hire qualified personnel and acquire the necessary weaponry, they often rely on former militia members (Schmeidel, 2008, 30-31). Moreover, on the provider side, the market resembles a mafia organization structure. Former warlords turned businessmen have established a foothold in legal Afghan security companies as well as in the illegal economy (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 20). In many cases, they have simply transformed their former militias into security companies or have provided protection without officially turning into a company. Finally, the most influential firms are in the hands of a small number of powerbrokers, holding public offices and maintaining private security forces. The extended Karzai family, for instance, owns the biggest security provider in Afghanistan, the Asia Security Group and Watan security, which have a near monopoly in the east and the south of the country (Forsberg and Kagan, 2010). In order to take control of rival firms and to further consolidate their position, they use their administrative powers as well as brute force (Roston, 2009). 
	The existence of a racketeer market is not only indicated by the presence of militias and warlords, but, secondly, also by the use of force as a means to conduct business. Even though the structure still includes a principal and an agent, and monetary exchange of goods and services takes place, the relationship is not an entirely voluntary one. In this type of market, force is not only traded as a good, but is used to influence behavior. The agent is a coercive entrepreneur who uses violence to coerce the principal into the relationship. In contrast to the market models discussed above, where neither of the actors had control over the threat, in racketeer markets, the agent is the source of the danger and simultaneously offers his services as a provider of security. In short, he creates insecurity in order to sell “protection” to clients (Tilly, 1985, 171, Reno, 2000, 47). According to a U.S. congress study dozens of warlords, strongmen and militia commanders do business in this manner in Afghanistan. They derive their power from their ability to control violence within a certain territory and the extraction of rent from those who occupy or transit the space (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 21). The most lucrative business in Afghanistan is to control the highways which supply trucks for the ISAF forces have to pass through. According to the former country manager of a trucking firm, each convoy had to pay. If not, the trucks got “shot up” (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 29). Another project manager explained that missions in more dangerous areas required additional fees to get the convoy trucks through without getting hit (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 32). Such arrangements do not resemble a voluntary market exchange. Afghan warlords and strongmen are coercive entrepreneurs who spread insecurity in order to force clients into buying protection.
Additionally, on a racketeer market the relationship between principal and agent goes beyond mere competition for the greatest benefit; instead, the relationship is one of rivalry. The rivalry is rooted in the antagonistic interest of both parties. The warlord-agents are interested in a continuance of insecurity, while the client seeks to further a more secure environment. In racketeer markets, the principal is trapped. Non-cooperation with the agent increases insecurity, while cooperation provides the agents with some short-term security. However, the payments to the racketeer strengthen the source of insecurity. The best the principal can hope to buy is a short-term ceasefire by bribing the agent (Beckert, 2009, 260). The rival role structure matches the circumstances on the Afghan market. According to a U.S. Congress report warlord- and strongman-PMSCs are in “fundamental conflict with a properly functioning government… [They are] antithetical to the Afghan state, and ultimately to U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan” (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 18). 

Level of performance: The level of performance will be illustrated by the services provided to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Although it is not the only contracting party in the Afghan market, it is the largest customer. Like the U.S. troops in Iraq, ISAF is engaged in a counterinsurgency operation/ nation building operation in Afghanistan. PMSCs were hired to provide compound and convoy security against insurgent attacks. In a racketeer market, the client cannot hope for a high level of performance as the agent can only hope for profit as long as insecurity reigns.  This is not to say that the agent does not deliver any kind of service. As long as the customers pay the “extortion money”, the convoys of warlord-led PMSCs deliver effective security for their clients. However, the customer has little choice, as the security only last as long as the money is paid. Thus, any trucking company that does not hire the warlords security services is running the risk of getting attacked. A senior official of a trucking company reported that only a few incidents occurred over the course of thousands of truck missions while a warlord owned company was contracted to them. However, as soon as the company attempted to set up its own security operation, the convoys came under attack frequently (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 31). In general, convoys that contracted warlord owned security firms reported much lower incident rates than those who protected themselves otherwise (Ibid. 22). 
In addition, the warlord-led PMSCs have little interest that the client succeeds in their stabilization efforts, as insecurity is at the base of the agent’s business model. Hence, the agent did not chose strategies to perform the task that furthered the client’s interest, but rather those that undermined it. U.S. Army Captain Matt Quiggle, for instance, claims that such firms are especially aggressive when they are in populated areas. Afghan security guards tasked with the protection of NATO supply convoys regularly fire wildly into villages (Abbot, 2010). Army LtCol. Dave Abrahams shared this view claiming that security firms use indiscriminate force frequently, and LtCol. French stated that PMSCs “start firing at anything that’s moving, and they will injure or kill innocent Afghans” (Naylor, 2009). Some consider therefore the militias to be the primary source of insecurity in Afghanistan (Sherman and DiDomenico, 2009, 7). This of course directly contradicts any counterinsurgency effort aimed at winning over the support of the population. 

Competition and Oversight: Unfortunately, oversight mechanisms similar to those put in place in Iraq did not exist until recently on the Afghan market. Indeed, the Afghan government attempted to regulate the private security industry in February 2008. However, as outlined above, politicians in Kabul and local authorities are often involved in the security business and have little interest in effective regulation (Sherman and DiDomenico, 2009, 5-6). It was not until February 2009, that the DoD set up the Armed Contractor Oversight Division in Afghanistan to implement contractor policies and investigate incidents (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010, 73-74). However, while these measures might help to regulate the legal segment of the market, they are unsuited for the illegal segment. Only bribes or force can make a difference in a place like Afghanistan (Beckert, 2009, 260). The weakness of the regulation effort is exemplified by Commander Ruhullah, a warlord in the security business. When asked about the regulation effort, he claimed that it did not apply to him (Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 2010). 	
In summary, in a racketeer market, the agent not only has no interest in furthering the principal’s goals, but his interests are antagonistic to those of the principal. While the principal intends to produce security through the contract, the agent is interested in maintaining insecurity in order to continue his protection racket. Additionally, any money paid contradicts the goal of building an effective democratic state, as it funds and strengthens forces outside the state structure - either alternative power centers, such as the warlords, or the political opponent, such as the Taliban. 

Conclusion
In the literature on PMSCs it is commonplace to assume a neoclassical market. However, the difference in the level of competition and oversight cannot account for the variance in the level of performance. While there was almost no competition and no oversight structure in Sierra Leone, EO performed well on behalf of its client. Similarly, the low level of performance in Iraq and Afghanistan remains puzzling, while competition was high and an oversight structure was present. This article goes beyond this conventional wisdom by arguing that the neoclassical market is only one of several possible market structures. Depending on the configuration of market structures, a different level of performance is expected of PMSCs.  In a collaborative market structure, the agent is expected to further the interests of the client, regardless of the level of competition and oversight. Sierra Leone was an exemplary case of such a collaborative structure. EO clearly went beyond the call of the contract to further the principal’s goals. The Iraqi market, in contrast, was structured according to the neoclassical paradigm. The agents were mainly interested in their own profit. Hence, as long as oversight was weak, PMSCs overcharged the client and provided low quality services. However, as oversight improved, the conduct did as well. Finally, Afghanistan was the prototype of a racketeer market with a rival market. The agents in the market, predominantly warlords, set up a protection racket and coerced the clients into the business relationship. Moreover, their business model required sustained insecurity and so they even took measures to thwart the implementation of the client’s interests.	 
	Although the market structure argument was able to account for the variance in PMSC performance, it is not able to solve the debate on PMSCs. Instead, it reveals that the current quarrel about the pros and cons of PMSCs cannot be decided easily. Proponents refer to Sierra Leone to show PMSC potential for high performance and even their effective utility in stabilizing a country (Shearer, 1998, O'Brian, 2000a), while opponents instead point to Afghanistan and Iraq to prove that they are just greedy actors and that their low performance might even harm the overall goals of the client (Rasor and Bauman, 2007, Singer, 2007). As it turns out, both may have a point, depending on the market structure.
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^1	  N.b.: There are other possible manifestations of markets and variations within each type, but these are certainly among the most important types.
^2	  It is noteworthy that the threshold of poor performance is not set at the level of court-proven fraud and misconduct. Such a theshold would only be able to capture the most severe cases. The threshold of poor performance is therefore set lower: First,  if midconduct was subject of high-level audits (e.g. Iraq study group, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction) it was included. Second, if an agent was replaced or debarred form futuer contracts by the client due to poor performance. 
^3	  Confidential Interview with a representative of the industry, April 16, 2009.
